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WHOLE No. 507

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# The Classical Weekly

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## QUINTILIAN AND THE DECLAMATION

It is not my purpose in this brief paper to enter into a general discussion of Quintilian's views as to the causes of the corruption of oratory in his day. My aim is more modest—to call attention to von Arnim's classification<sup>1</sup> of Quintilian as a Neo-Sophist<sup>2</sup>, in his educational views, and to quote a few passages from Quintilian to show how Neo-Sophistic views affect what he has to say about the corruption of oratory in Rome. The discussion will be concerned, almost entirely, with the Schools of Declamation.

The need of a discussion of this subject is indicated by the inadequate, and, at times, inaccurate statements of our writers on Roman literature concerning Quintilian's relation to the educational theories and conflicts of his own and preceding times. The statement of W. S. Teuffel (*Geschichte der Römischen Literatur*<sup>3</sup>, § 325.7) that "Trotzdem stützt sich seine eigene Darlegung auf die älteren Handbücher. . ." is too indefinite in its reference to the handbooks, and his remark that "Im Anschluss an die besonders von der Stoa vertretene Ansicht hebt er die sittliche Grundlage der Beredsamkeit hervor. . ." is liable to a much too broad interpretation in regard to Quintilian's agreement with the Stoics. The question of Quintilian's relation to the various schools of rhetoric is left in equal doubt by Martin Schanz, *Geschichte der Römischen Litteratur*, Volume 2, Part 2<sup>4</sup>, § 484 (1913). August Reuter, in his dissertation, *De Quintiliani Libro Qui fuit De Causis Corruptae Eloquentiae*, 2 (Breslau, 1887), states that Quintilian imagined in his own mind a perfect form of oratory and taught the rules of oratory in accordance therewith<sup>5</sup>.

If Quintilian's perfect orator is altogether the child of his own imagination, he has a remarkable double in the perfect orator described by Cicero, *De Oratore* 3.79-81; 1.128. With these passages compare Quintilian 10.1.35-36; Book 1, Prooemium 9-20 (especially 18).

Both Cicero and Quintilian attempt to describe the

perfect orator; both claim that the orator should be skilled in all arts and that he should be a student of philosophy as well as of rhetoric, and, most important of all, both claim that he should have a practical training for life. The two pictures are in all essentials identical. It is no more likely that Quintilian evolved his perfect orator out of his own mind than that Cicero did. And it is certainly true that Cicero did not (on this point see von Arnim's arguments, 99-114). Both Cicero and Quintilian, then, set before us, modified, of course, in harmony with their own prejudices, an educational ideal which had existed long before their times, the ideal of the Sophists.

The Sophists had, from the beginning, been advocates of a practical education, an education which would prepare a man to take an independent and commanding position in public life. Its product was the *πολιτικός ἀνὴρ*, the man who, equipped with a practical working knowledge of such subjects as dialectic, grammar, philosophy, music, arithmetic, geometry, and astrology, rounded out his education with rhetoric and practice in the exercises of the Schools (von Arnim, 134), and became able to speak successfully on either side of a proposition. Such a man stood forth as an orator qualified to discuss persuasively matters coming before the popular assembly, to win his case before judge or jury, to pronounce a eulogy, or to deliver an invective with telling effect. The goal of this education was oratorical ability. Its product, the *πολιτικός ἀνὴρ*, was no specialist. He studied logic, mathematics, grammar, etc., only far enough to be able to use them whenever necessary (von Arnim, 134-135). These studies stood side by side as of equal dignity, but all subsidiary to and laying the foundation for the higher rhetorical training in which the Sophistical system culminated. Such a training had the ancient Sophists Hippias of Elis, Prodicus of Ceos, Thrasymachus of Chalcedon, Protagoras of Abdera, and Gorgias of Leontini, whom Cicero (*De Oratore* 3. 126-129) calls *illos veteres doctores auctoresque dicendi*, the ancestors (*maiores*) of the modern orator, men who were, he says, the opposite of specialists.

The Neo-Sophistic of Quintilian's day held fast to this practical ideal, but also conceived of the Sophistic art as a thing of value in itself as contributing to the aesthetic enjoyment of the possessor (von Arnim, 133, 135). The art, in a word, culminated in the harmonious, all-round, thoroughly trained personality in which aesthetic, intellectual, and practical perfection were attained and in which the aesthetic predominated.

The rhetorical exercises of the Sophists had always been of a practical kind, including topics of a general nature (*theses*) and others concerned with persons,

<sup>1</sup>See Hans von Arnim, *Leben und Werke des Dio von Prusa*, mit einer Einleitung: Sophistik, Rhetorik, Philosophie in ihrem Kampf um die Jugendbildung (Berlin, 1898).

<sup>2</sup>Compare von Arnim, 134: "Quintilian, den wir auch als Vertreter des sophistischen Ideals heranziehen dürfen. . ." See also 91-92: "Wenn man Quintilians Schilderungen des vollkommenen Redners liest, so meint man oft, einen Stoiker reden zu hören. In Wahrheit ist sein Standpunkt dem geschilderten stoischen diametral entgegengesetzt. Denn während die Stoiker die Beredsamkeit als ein Nebenprodukt der höchsten philosophischen Erkenntnis ansehen, das auf keinem andern Wege erzielt werden kann, hat Quintilian, der dieselben hochtönenden Phrasen gebraucht und II 20, 4 auch die *ἀρετὰ ῥητορικὴ* als eine *ἀρετή* bezeichnet, dabei nicht das philosophische Bildungsideal im Auge, sondern das rhetorisch-sophistische, das alle *μαθήματα* nur soweit betreibt, als sie den praktischen Zwecken des Redners dienen und auch die Philosophie nur als eines der *μαθήματα* ansieht, die diesen Zwecken dienstbar gemacht werden können."

<sup>3</sup>Teuffel, in the fifth edition by L. Schwabe, translated by G. C. W. Warr, § 325. 7, adopted this view. The editors of the seventh edition wisely discarded it.

times, and places (*hypotheses*). On this matter compare Cicero, *Topica* 79; *De Oratore* 1.138. For a time the *theses* were entirely claimed for the philosophers who gave rhetorical training, but the Sophistic rhetoricians never ceased to claim them as the earliest type of exercise which they used. Cicero used them both; compare *Orator* 45-46; Quintilian 3.5.14-15. In *De Oratore* 1.138 Cicero says that every speech is concerned either with questions of a general nature or with questions definitely connected with persons, places, etc., thus plainly indicating that the *theses* and the *hypotheses*, being exercises on both these kinds of questions, were of course the best and the only necessary practical exercises for the orator.

Alongside the Sophists of the higher type, whose ideal was the practical training of the public man, there existed from the earliest times the so-called Vulgar School of Sophists, whose ideal was a cheap expertness in judicial oratory, the ability to make the better appear the worse and the worse the better, purely for purposes of private advantage. The training of this class of Sophists consisted of the learning of certain rules for arranging an argument to be made in court, and the acquirement of a readiness and facility in speaking there. Such Sophists were always popular with the crowd, and, as they made their peripatetic rounds, their lectures were eagerly listened to by the multitude. They cared little for learning of any kind apart from the oratorical facility gained by mastering the rules of their art of persuasion and by the practice of declamations. Their aim was merely to persuade, to win their case, and to do so by catering to the crowd. This 'Vulgar Sophistic' could not contend successfully for adoption as the educational ideal of a nation, and we need not concern ourselves with it in this discussion further than to call attention to it as a manifestation of the characteristically practical aims of Sophistic education in general, and as contributing to the Neo-Sophistic a fondness for *ex tempore* speaking and for cheap ostentation in the times of decadence.

The Neo-Sophistic of Quintilian's day was broader than the old Sophistic. It was eclectic in its system of training and in its educational thought. It not only identified the completely educated, ideal man with the orator (von Arnim, 133); but it conceived of this ideal orator as a harmonious, well-rounded, completely trained personality in which intellectual, aesthetic, and practical perfection stood side by side, of equal right and equal dignity (von Arnim, 132-133). Such should the orator be as he stood forth in law-court or in assembly. But beyond this ideal the Neo-Sophists prized ability to use oratorical powers merely to delight an audience. They took most pleasure in oratory for its own sake. They had a high scientific interest in their work—an interest which finally led them too often into vain ostentation, a love of excessive ornament, and a preference for improvisation (von Arnim, 135). It was largely for this reason that the Neo-Sophistic and Asianism became practically identical, although we must not forget that they do not appear in exactly the same way or with equally pronounced

characteristics at all times and in all the orators under their influence. Some Neo-Sophists went to extremes in the cultivation of the ornamental, altogether neglecting matter, while others, e. g. Quintilian, Tacitus, and Petronius, adopted a saner view and an Asian style strongly imbued with Atticism. These Attic ideals, though they were unable to prevail over Asianism under the Empire, nevertheless called the attention of men to the great masters of olden times, and were able greatly to tone down the exuberance of many of the Asians of better taste and judgment. This accounts for the fundamental differences between the style of Seneca and that of Quintilian, each of whom regarded himself as an Atticist; both in reality were Asians, albeit in different degrees. When Quintilian (Book 8, Prooemium 16-17) speaks of the Asians as corrupt, he must be understood to speak of those who had yielded more than he himself had to the demand for vulgar display, and who had emphasized more than he had the attention that should be given to embellishment as compared with the attention given to subject-matter.

I am conscious that I have but imperfectly sketched the outlines of the Sophistic ideal as set forth by von Arnim. Those who would go into the question more deeply I shall refer to his pages and to a study of the original sources themselves.

It will now be in order to show that Quintilian's explanations of the causes of the corruption of oratory in his day either proceed from the Neo-Sophistic view, or at least are in harmony with that view.

That oratory had declined at Rome since Cicero's time was evident to all. Early in the first Christian century Seneca Rhetor (*Controversiae*, Introduction 6-24), bitterly laments its decadence, attributing conditions to the increase of luxury among the people and to deterioration in the body politic, or to some evil fate.

Petronius (1-2) complains of the utter worthlessness of the Schools of Declamation; he declares that, in those schools, <discipuli> hoc tantum proficiunt ut, cum in forum venerint, putent se in alium orbem terrarum delatos, adding et ideo ego adulescentulos existimo in scholis stultissimos fieri. . . . He also inveighs against the weakness of parental discipline and deplores the recent advent of Asianism, which he calls ventosa istaec et enormis loquacitas <quae> animos. . . iuvenum ad magna surgentes veluti pestilenti quodam sidere afflavit, semelque corrupta regula eloquentia stetit et obmutuit.

Tacitus has left us a work—the *Dialogus*—entirely devoted to a discussion of the degeneration of oratory. His opinion of conditions is given in his opening sentence: Saepe ex me requiris. . . cur. . . nostra potissimum aetas deserta et laude eloquentiae orbata vix nomen ipsum oratoris retineat; neque enim ita appellamus nisi antiquos. . . . His reasons for the decline are given in Chapters 34 and 35, and we need note here only that in Chapters 36-41 he treats of political conditions.

Pliny the Younger (Epp. 2.14) gives us a vivid

picture of the deplorable condition of the Centumviral Court, into which callow youth fresh from the Schools pushed themselves, with their hired clacquers, the so-called *Laudiceni*. At another time, however, after delivering a seven-hour speech to a great crowd in court, amid great applause, he is confident, in his momentary exaltation and pride, that conditions may not be hopeless after all. He exclaims: 'Let us study, then, and not charge others with laziness in order to cover up our own'; *sunt qui audiant, sunt qui legant, nos modo dignum aliquid auribus, dignum chartis elaboremus*.

Quintilian is in absolute agreement with these critics<sup>4</sup>. Passages innumerable could be cited. Compare e.g. 1.8.9. . . *nos in omnia deliciarum vitia dicendi quoque ratione defluximus*; 4.2.122 (here he is contrasting his own day with the good old times, *quibus omnis ad utilitatem potius quam ad ostentationem componebatur oratio*); 10.1.125 (here he says that he was attempting. . . *corruptum et omnibus vitiis fractum dicendi genus revocare ad severiora iudicia*). His interest in the subject is, of course, chiefly attested by the fact that he wrote a book *De Causis Corruptae Eloquentiae* (8.6.76; Book 6, Prooemium 3; 8.3.58).

In order to understand fundamentally Quintilian's attitude towards this subject we must remember that he views it entirely from the standpoint of the schoolmaster. He regards the condition of the art of oratory as depending altogether upon education. I believe that he was as firmly convinced of the value of education as a panacea for all ills (except bodily ills) as any educational faddist of our own day. If he had the vision of a philosopher or of a historian, he failed to reveal the fact. He is as silent as all the rest of his contemporaries, except Tacitus, about the influence of political conditions. He finds fault with parents for lack of discipline, with children for impertinence and laziness, with pedagogues for bad character, with teachers for ignorance, with society for luxury and a love of display and affectation—all stock criticisms current in his day and long before, such as we have noted as early as Seneca Rhetor. We must, however, do Quintilian the justice of admitting that, even if he realized the effect of adverse political conditions, he could not with good face mention it in his work, after the many favors which he had received at the hands of the Flavian Emperors.

But in the time of Cicero oratory was regarded as pure and incorrupt. That was the time when the Schools were said to be sound, when great orators admitted aspiring young orators to companionship, and when young men learned a virile oratory by observing masters in real conflict in the forum. It was not until later that the declamation began to exert its harmful influence. Cicero's time is the time to which Quintilian always points in contrast with his own. Cicero is his ideal. In 10.1.112-113 Quintilian exalts Cicero as the supreme model for orators. In 1.8.10-12 he mentions him as the chief of the *summi oratores*. In 12.10.48

and 9.3.1 he calls Cicero one of the *veteres* referred to always as pure and incorrupt. In 10.2.17 Cicero is classed as one of the *antiqui*. Teuffel is eminently correct (Roman Literature, English Translation of the Fifth Edition, § 325.7: the seventh German edition is in substantial agreement) when he says that Quintilian, in opposing the corrupt tendencies of his time,

. . . falls back upon nature. . . and the *veteres*. . . especially Cicero, who is always spoken of with the highest respect and defended even in his weak points. . . Quintilian's exposition is founded mainly on him and only reluctantly differs from him. . . 6, 3, 3 he speaks of his *amor immodicus praecipui in eloquentia viri*, and exclaims 10, 1, 112: *hunc spectemus, hoc propositum nobis sit exemplum, ille se profecisse sciat cui Cicero valde placebit*. . .

In 3.1.120 we find the enthusiastic exclamation, *unicum apud nos specimen orandi docendique oratorias artes, M. Tullius*. Many other passages could be cited to prove his extreme regard for Cicero, and his agreement with Cicero. Quintilian, the Neo-Sophist, is very dependent upon the great orator, whose views upon philosophy, rhetoric, and oratory and their relation to practical life so largely determined his own. As a consequence, we may presume that, whenever a given style of oratory departs from the practice and the precepts of Cicero, Quintilian will regard it as in so far corrupt<sup>5</sup>.

What was there about the *veteres* which Quintilian especially commended and which, when it was lost, caused oratory to decay? The great quality which he assigns to them is the determination to make their oratory serve a practical end. Their aim in speaking was to win their case in the law court, or to win men in the assembly to their point of view. Here we have at once the historic attitude of the Sophists. Nevertheless, this does not mean, he says, that they did not embellish their speeches with quotations from the poets, with sparkling thoughts (*sententiae*), and in fact with nearly every kind of ornament. Thus, in Quintilian 1.8.10-12, it is stated that quotations from the poets were to be found in the speeches of the *summi oratores*. But these embellishments were used with a double purpose, (1) to please, (2) to help win the case. Compare 12.10.45: *Atque id fecisse M. Tullium video, ut cum plurimum utilitati, tum partem quandam delectationi daret, cum et suam se rem agere diceret, ageret autem maxime litigatoris. Nam hoc ipso proderat, quod placebat. Sententiae*, which were used so excessively in his own time, Quintilian finds in Cicero (12.10.48): he asks, *dum rem contineant et copia non redundent et ad victoriam spectent, quis utile neget?* In 10.2.27 he practically sums up the case of the *veteres* (referred to by name in §25, to include Cicero, Caesar, Caelius, Pollio, and Calvus) with the statement that with them. . . *omnia, etiam quae delectationi videantur data, ad victoriam spectent*.

The 'ancients', then, made utility (*utilitas, victoria*)

<sup>4</sup>Quintilian is cited in the text of Ferdinand Meister (G. Freytag, Leipzig, and F. Tempsky, Prague, 1886). I have, however, in the interests of clearness departed, in places, from Meister's punctuation.

<sup>5</sup>I have not space to discuss Reuter's views on the extent of the application of the word *corruptus* in Quintilian. I think, however, that he confines it too exclusively to the theory of style. I believe that, in reality, any variation from the Neo-Sophistic ideal as conceived by Quintilian (or really Cicero) would be to Quintilian a *vitium*.

the chief aim of their oratory and gave a secondary, but very important, place to the pleasing elements, using them only so far as they contributed to winning the case. Quotations from poets, for instance, may be used to add the weight of authority to a statement, to lend dignity to an argument, or to give the judge or the jury or the assembly a pleasing respite from the strain of argumentative discussion (compare 1.8.10-12). In 4.2.122 we have the practical purpose of the 'ancients' (*utilitas*) contrasted with the aim of Quintilian's own day.

We may now ask why had oratory declined so much, and what, in Quintilian's opinion, was the only road to a restoration of its former vigor and power. As I hinted a while ago, it is to him entirely a matter of education. In the very beginning of his work (Book 1, Prooemium 5), his thought as to the importance of education is plain, when he says, *Ego cum existimen nihil arti <'study'> oratoriae alienum, sine quo fieri non posse oratorem fatendum est.* . . . And again, near the end of his work, he shows that he regards education as all important (12.10.1 *rhethorices atque oratoris opus oratio*). Oratory, he says here, 'is the product of rhetoric and the orator', that is to say, of education and natural ability, and without these the orator cannot be. In 2.19.2, in discussing the relative value of natural ability and training, he states that, while natural ability is more valuable for the ordinary speaker, the consummate orator will owe more to training (*consummatos autem plus doctrinae debere quam naturae putabo*).

As Quintilian thought education all important, we shall need to know what his opinions were about the Schools. These are most clearly stated in 9.2.81: . . . paulo plus scholis demus: nam et in his educatur orator, et in eo quo modo declamatur positum est etiam quo modo agatur, 'The orator receives his training in the Schools, and the success with which he performs his exercises there will be an earnest of his success later on in the courts'.

Note the high value he gives to the declamation, an ascription confirmed by many other passages, such as 2.10.1-2:

. . . pauca mihi de ipsa ratione declamandi dicenda sunt, quae quidem ut ex omnibus novissime inventa, ita multo est utilissima, nam et cuncta illa de quibus diximus in se fere continet et veritati proximam imaginem reddit, ideoque ita est celebrata ut plerisque videretur ad formandam eloquentiam vel sola sufficere. Neque enim virtus ulla perpetuae dumtaxat orationis reperiri potest, quae non sit cum hac dicendi meditatione communis.

Quintilian might have thought that the Schools and the educational system of the day were all right, and have attributed the decline in oratory to a deterioration in natural ability in the pupils, as natural ability is the other element of the two which unite to make the perfect orator. But he did *not*. He finds natural ability as great as ever. Compare 10.1.122 *sunt enim summa hodie quibus inlustratur forum ingenia*, and 10.2.28 *perfectus orator, quem nunc consummari potissimum oporteat, cum tanto plura exempla bene dicendi supersunt quam illis qui adhuc summi sunt*

*contigerunt*; 2.5.24 *neque enim nos tarditatis natura damnavit.* . . . ; 1.1.2. . . *in pueris elucet spes plurimorum, quae cum emoritur aetate, manifestum est non naturam defecisse sed curam.* It is, then, not natural ability that is lacking, but rather correct training.

What, then, was the matter with the Schools? We have already seen the great importance assigned by Quintilian to the declamation. He calls it the most useful of the school exercises, for two reasons: (1) it includes all the others, and (2)—most significant—it most nearly approaches reality, i.e. it most nearly resembles real pleading in the courts (compare 2.10.1-2).

In emphasizing the value of the declamation Quintilian is true to the Sophistic doctrine of the *twídaia*, facility in extempore speaking, as well as to the rules of rhetoric applying to the set speech, for, as the declamation includes all exercises, it must include these. Any fault in the instruction in declaiming would be a serious fault. And just here, in Quintilian's judgment, the chief cause of oratorical degeneration was to be found.

Let us, then, see what he thinks about the history and the purpose of the declamation.

Quintilian, rightly or wrongly it matters not, had conceived the idea that the declamation was invented as a preparation for court pleading (I presume he was right), and that the purpose of the declamation was to represent or to reproduce court pleading as closely as possible in the School. Compare 2.10.8 *si foro non praeferat, aut scaenicae ostentationi aut furiosae vociferationi simillimum est*; 2.10.4 *declamatio, in quantum maxime potest, imitetur eas actiones in quarum exercitationem <'for training in which'> reperta est*; 4.2.29 *Nam cum sit declamatio forensium actionum meditatio.* . . . 'since the *declamatio* is a practising of <for> pleadings in the courts. . . ' Quintilian believed that the corruption of oratory was mainly due to faults connected with the declamation, or, perhaps it would be more true to say, that the loss of the old idea of a practical education had so demoralizing an effect upon the declamation that it itself became one of the chief causes of the corruption of oratory (compare 5.12.17-18, 21-23).

In truth, the declamation had been fundamentally changed in its character, according to Quintilian. Compare 5.12.17, 'Declamations, by means of which we used to practice, as it were, fully armed for contests in the forum, long ago ceased to reflect the true image of oratory, and <now> lack substance, being written merely to please'; 5.12.18, 'The manly character of oratory and the power of pointed and robust speech we have veneered with a kind of superficial elocution, and we fancy that we need not concern ourselves about strength, provided we make our language smooth and brilliant'; 2.5.24, 'We have changed our style and indulged <our love of ornament> more than we ought'.

The declamation no longer prepared for real contests in the forum, but was used to serve the aesthetic

end of delighting an audience with vain ostentation and sparkling elocutionary and stylistic effects. This Quintilian most strongly disapproves. In 8.3.13 he says, 'In a serious question <a trial>, anxiety for mere applause should be the orator's last concern'. But it was applause alone that the declaimers sought, and to such a degree that, as Quintilian says (5.12.23), *nunc illud mali est, quod necessaria plerumque silentio transeunt nec in dicendo videtur esse bona utilitas*. This he bitterly characterizes (5.12.21) as putting into the hands of the orator (who, of course, should prepare to enter real contests in the forum) not arms, but the clanging cymbals of elocution (*nos qui oratorem studemus effingere, non arma sed tympana eloquentiae demus?*). He will not so instruct the youth committed to him. In 5.12.21 he says, further,

'The youth whom I instruct must address himself with all his might to an imitation of reality, and, in view of the fact that he is destined to fight often in legal contests, he must, while yet in School, learn to make victory <winning the case> his goal and acquire the art of striking the vitals of his enemy and of protecting his own'.

Who was to blame for conditions? Quintilian's answer is that the teachers were to blame. Compare 2.10.3-5:

'... It <the declamation> has fallen away <from its true purpose> through the fault of the teachers <*culpa doctentium*> to such an extent that the liberties <*licentiae*> taken by the teachers and their ignorance have become some of the main influences which caused oratory to become corrupt. . . . Let, then, the very material <of instruction> which we inve it be as nearly like the truth as possible, imitating those <real> cases <in the forum> for which they were invented to prepare. For it is a vain hunt one would have among sponsons and edicts for *magi* and pestilences and oracles and stepmothers more cruel than those we see on the stage<sup>6</sup>.

He continues thus, in §§ 7-9:

'... Those who think that the declamation has absolutely nothing in any way to do with legal cases <claiming of course that it is epideictic in its origin> certainly do not see very clearly even into the reason why that exercise was invented, for, if it does not prepare for the forum, it is most like the ostentation and silly shouting that one sees on the stage. For why should we learn to instruct a judge <as to the facts of a case>, if there is to be no judge <in reality to face later on>, or to deliver the narrative <part of a speech> which all know is imaginary, or to adduce proofs in a suit <of a kind> which no one will ever be called upon to defend <in real life>? This is indeed merely a waste of time. As to being roused to anger or affected with grief, what a joke that is, unless by exercises resembling a <real> contest we are accustomed to prepare for real dangers and battles! Is there, then, no difference between the style of forensic oratory and the style of the declamation? No, if we speak in order to learn how to speak in court and not for mere display<sup>7</sup>.

The teachers of declamation, then, had so changed the nature of the declamation from that of an exercise representing as nearly as possible real cases in the forum, for which it was meant to prepare, that it had lost all

semblance of reality and no longer prepared one to win his case in court, but was used merely for display and served no practical purpose. This was due to the fact that the teachers had forgotten the history of the declamation and its original purpose, and had permitted themselves to take all kinds of liberties with it. They had forgotten that in the time of the *veleres* it had a practical aim. The *veleres* lived in a period when *omnis ad utilitatem potius quam ad ostentationem componebatur oratio et erant adhuc severiora iudicia* (4.2.122).

We have here the key to the whole matter. The ancients had as their watchword *utilitas* (the true Sophistic ideal), while the moderns, in the easy cultivation of the epideictic side of the Sophistic art, had made their ideal a vain *ostentatio*. Compare 12.10.42, 'The ancients spoke simply and naturally. Later orators, resembling poets, looked upon departures from truth and nature as merits'. Other similar statements are to be found in 10.2.27 and 12.10.45.

Quintilian stood for *utilitas*, for a practical training, for winning his case before the court and before the assembly, and so did Cicero and all those under strong Sophistic influence.

It is evident from our investigation that there were two parties among the Sophists themselves, who quarrelled about the origin and the theory of the declamation, one claiming that it was epideictic in its origin, the other (to which Quintilian belonged) claiming that it was invented as a practical exercise in judicial oratory. A clear understanding of that fact, I think, throws much light upon the discussions relative to Asianism and Atticism and the corruption of oratory.

If I had space I might easily prove that Quintilian agrees even in details with Cicero in his views regarding the relation of philosophy to rhetoric, and I might point out specific faults which he mentions as due to the ignorance and the licence of the teachers of declamation which resulted in corruption not only in diction and style, but also in regard to subject-matter, arrangement, delivery, and in fact in everything which concerned a speech<sup>8</sup>.

ONARGA MILITARY SCHOOL,  
ONARGA, ILLINOIS.

WILBUR J. GREER

## REVIEWS

Greek Religion to the Time of Hesiod. By A. Le Marchant. Manchester, England: Sherratt and Hughes (1923). Pp. 185.

In recent years much has been written about that vague and varied thing, the primitive religion of the Greeks as opposed to the highly developed official cults. But only the specialist in the field knows how

<sup>6</sup>Readers of THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY will doubtless be glad to be reminded of certain articles which deal with Quintilian, particularly as a schoolmaster. One, by the late Professor Charles E. Bennett, entitled *An Ancient Schoolmaster's Message to Present-Day Teachers*, was published in THE CLASSICAL JOURNAL 4 (1909), 149-164. In THE CLASSICAL JOURNAL 15 (1920), 515-534, Professor Gordon J. Laing, of the University of Chicago, had an article entitled *Quintilian the Schoolmaster*. An English scholar, Professor Herbert Augustus Strong, published, through the University Press of Liverpool, in 1908, a pamphlet of 28 pages called *A Roman Schoolmaster and Some of his Probable Views of Modern Education*. C. K.

<sup>7</sup>Compare Tacitus, *Dialogus* 35 *Sequitur. . . autem. . . persequantur*.

<sup>8</sup>That some claimed that the declamation was epideictic in origin is clear from Quintilian 2.10.10.

to obtain access to this wealth of material. Just as the mineral in an unexploited area lies hidden here and there in pockets and seams, so information on this topic, so far as the general student of ancient Greek life is concerned, is concealed in casual notes, disconnected journal articles, occasional paragraphs, or, very rarely, in brief chapters in which the subject is treated as of little relative significance. Classical scholarship has long been waiting for the appearance of some writer who, playing the rôle of miner in relation to this scattered material, would collect it, sort it, refine it, and so display it as to reveal its real worth as an explanation of the religious beliefs and systems that come after it. As Mr. Le Marchant has essayed this task in the book under review and has accomplished it with marked success, we must give him the special recognition that is accorded to pioneers. The fact that the book is written in a style of unusual freshness and charm should add to the warmth of its welcome. While now and then a labored phrase, a forced comparison or an affected staccato arrangement of sentences may make the reader uncomfortably aware of the presence of a very self-conscious author, yet in the main the style is sincere and convincing.

As this book is not a big one, a reviewer has the unusual opportunity of commenting upon its individual chapters in succession and thus is enabled to reproduce on a small scale the author's treatment of his subject.

In the second paragraph of the first chapter Mr. Le Marchant broaches his theme with the words: "What preceded the cathedral of Rouen and of Rheims and of Tours? What preceded the Olympus of Homer? The one could not have been a primitive form any more than the other". Now everybody will assent to the statement with which the author replies to his own questions, but there are still many who doubt the ability of a scholar living in this late day to recover the remnants of prehistoric religions and to reconstruct them into systems of faith and ritual. For those, then, who do not know or who may discredit the marvels of restoration accomplished by the mythologist and the folklorist Mr. Le Marchant has this to say concerning the source of his materials of earlier date than Homer and Hesiod:

Inasmuch as the beliefs of Greece of to-day are traceable to the classic period, the presumption amounts to a complete certainty that those beliefs were nearest to the religious origins of the people. They belong to an age antecedent to an ordered theogony. They resisted the incoming of high deities that can be specialized by names and can have temples for their worship; they succeeded through all the ages in appropriating unto themselves, in spite of hierarchies, sanctuaries, and oracles, a portion of the unfeigned homage of the populace. The lament of St. John Chrysostom over the inveteracy within the recognized church of customs which he calls pagan, but which were really ancient, was as appropriate in the days of Hesiod as in his own.

When religion has become conventionalized, and has been covered with the mantle of literature, the grosser elements pass into the twilight of life, like an ancestor of ill-repute, but the conscience of the people is aware they are there, and in secret, if not openly, pays its homage to them. In these days of universal education in England old dames still read each other's fortune in the grounds of their tea-cups, but no reference to the

custom will be found in contemporaneous philosophy or poetry.

The title of Chapter II, *The Religion of the Ghostly*, is plainly an exposition of the belief in the *Kâtes*, which taken together constituted for the primitive Greek a sort of "pantheism of hostile forces, which man has to defeat or placate". The *Dark Side of Religion*, the title of the next chapter, is an allusion to human sacrifice. From the mythic stories of the immolation of Polyxena and Iphigenia, of the ceremonial slaughter of strangers among the Taurians and of the tragic death of Pentheus, the author salvages the fact that in the early twilight of Hellenic civilization human beings were often slain like beasts upon the altar of religion. Testimony in confirmation is found in abundance in the records of Pausanias. The contention that the practice still survived in Athens of the fifth century constitutes a large part of Chapter IV. The author, in opposition to certain scholars, maintains that the two *Pharmakoi* of the festival of the Thargelia at Athens were actually, rather than mimetically, killed. Whether he argues rightly or not from the evidence he presents, he is undoubtedly right so far as he interprets the manner of their removal from the city as the relic of a real human sacrifice of primitive days. The vagueness of ancient references to the *Pharmakoi* he regards as due to the consciousness of the Greeks of the classical period that the practice was evil and barbaric as well as to their shame at its survival. The argument, even if not convincing, is illuminating.

The titles of Chapters V, VI, and VII are excellent indices to their contents: *The Living and the Dead*; *The Third Estate of the Dead*; *Intercourse with the Unseen*. Mr. Le Marchant has given more thought than do most writers in selecting and wording sectional headings.

Chapters VIII and IX are devoted to the Olympians. While they contain nothing really new to those who are familiar with the field, yet the manner in which the old observations are made is so refreshingly out of the ordinary that one almost gets the illusion that the material is new. By reason of this superior 'difference' these chapters are a genuine scholarly contribution. One could scarcely find a more sympathetic and comprehensive estimate of the essential genius of Olympianism. The following quotation will give a slight idea at least of the author's point of view and method:

The Olympians were neither local nor tribal: they were cosmopolitan, and the cosmos was Hellas. They were Hellenioi, whose fame was the possession of every Hellene, whose sceptre was over all Hellenes. The peoples became a kingdom through the throne of their Olympian king. There was no such thing as heresy in Greece.

Other elements co-operated to accomplish this result, but religion was undoubtedly the chief. What Greece and the world would have been without it is beyond conception. The only imaginable alternative is that the land would have fallen by fragments under the dominion of some conquering warrior, and the Achaioi would have been known merely as the tribes of Helvetia and Germania are known, by having their names inscribed upon the monuments of some earlier Caesar.

The Olympians are now interred in the graveyard of

abandoned superstitions and beliefs, but before they passed hence they conferred a blessing upon mankind which the world can with gratitude acknowledge.

Finally, the gods of Olympus brought a large measure of intellectual order into the religious life of the people of Greece. Men will endure many contradictions in their theology, and incompatibilities may stand side by side. The ark of Jahveh can stand in the temple of Dagon. But there are limits, and the narrower they are the better for the elevation of the mind. Disorder in the heavenly places makes disorder in the earthly. Because thought and action alike lack a fixed centre, the waters of life are navigated by all the stars instead of by the Pole Star. The Olympians did not reduce the theogony to a single unity, but they made it into a single constellation.

They were immensely superior to the nature forces they displaced, and in comparison merited their thrones. They had human qualities, even if they lacked some of those that are now called divine. They were not merely potencies to be dreaded, with whom man could hold no real communion—whose acts had no moral value, nor could man fathom their meaning. They were mind and reason and a rough form of justice, though all were scarred by human defects.

In the group of Chapters on Homer (X-XIII) and in those on Hesiod (XIV-XV) Mr. Le Marchant presents nothing novel, but as usual what he says is said well and attractively. For his appraisal of Hesiod all students of Greek literature should be grateful.

UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN ONTARIO,  
LONDON, ONTARIO, CANADA

W. SHERWOOD FOX

**A Book of Latin Poetry.** Selections from Naevius to the Hymn-writers. Chosen and Annotated by John W. Basore and Shirley H. Weber. Boston: Allyn and Bacon (1925). Pp. xx + 346.

This is the most attractive Latin text-book that has come to the notice of the reviewer for a long time. With so large a part of the students in College taking only one year of Latin many instructors consider it desirable to give their classes a taste of many of the best of the Roman poets, instead of spending all the time on one or two writers. This serves the double purpose of giving as much as possible to those who go no farther, and whetting the appetites of the chosen few who elect to continue their study of Latin. The long felt need of appropriate selections with adequate notes for such classes is here fully met. The amount of text (145 pages) is roughly the same as that contained in the Selection of Latin Verse Edited by the Instructors in Latin in Williams College (see *THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY* 7:223-224, 9:71-72); but the notes are on a far ampler scale (200 pages as against 63). Included in the notes are excellent short historical sketches of Latin poetry. There is a brief Introduction (XV-XX) outlining the various meters represented in the volume (20 in all); in more than half of these a quotation from an English poet paves the way to a quicker grasping of the rhythm. But the real charm of the work lies in the apt quotations from other poets, principally English, that introduce almost every selection, and in the copious examples of similar parallel passages in the notes, nearly every page of which contains at least one such extract.

Ranging from Naevius to the hymn-writers, the

selections cover the field admirably. There are nine pages from Lucretius, 15 from Catullus, 14 from Vergil, 18 from Horace, 14 from Ovid, 9 from Seneca, and 7 from Martial. Not all of everybody's favorites will be found here, yet the inviting selections make it difficult for the teacher to omit. It is inevitable that there should be some duplication of the poems gathered in similar books; many of the lyrics of Catullus and Horace, for example, simply can not be left out of any Latin anthology. But the fuller notes and the numerous parallels in other poets make the book eminently worth while, and abundantly justify the editors in putting out their selection.

HAMILTON COLLEGE

DONALD BLYTHE DURHAM

**The Ethics of Socrates.** By Miles Menander Dawson. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons (1924).

This is not a work of investigation, but, as the subtitle puts it, "a compilation of the teachings of the Father of Greek and Roman Philosophy, as reported by his Disciples, Plato and Xenophon, and commented upon by Aristotle, Marcus Aurelius, Epictetus and others". The arrangement of the material is topical. The nineteen chapters have such headings as Science the Basis of Ethics, Happiness Man's Goal, Immortality of the Soul, Ethical Value of the Fine Arts, Duties toward Mankind. The individual chapter is not a mere collection of quotations. It receives direction and a degree of coherence by means of the author's running commentary, which consists usually of an introductory sentence or two, and of captions and brief transitional remarks which carry the reader along. I say "reader", for the book is evidently intended for reading and not merely for reference. The quotations are from standard English translations. The author makes no claim to familiarity with the originals, nor is he concerned with such questions as that of the relation of the historical Socrates to the Socrates of Plato and Xenophon, nor has he any theory as to the Socratic succession. His concern is with the main stream, wherever it emerges. One recognizes here and there the limitations of the systematic method of presentation, in instances where isolated passages, apart from their context, do duty as proof-texts. But in general the work of selection is carefully done.

It might be fair to say that the informing principle of the book as a whole is the conviction in the author's mind that—as Matthew Arnold once put it—"conduct is three-fourths of life". Mr. Dawson, who is a man of affairs and an expert in actuarial science, as well as an author, published ten years ago a parallel work, *The Ethics of Confucius*. His present work on *The Ethics of Socrates* deserves a welcome from us whose interests are likely to be first of all in the technical side of scholarly questions, just because it is an approach from a different angle to a great subject, and is therefore an effective reassertion of the values that are to be found in one of the great domains of classical study.

HAMILTON COLLEGE

EDWARD FITCH

L'Italie Primitive et les Débuts de l'Impérialisme Romain. By Léon Home. (Paris, 1925). Pp. xiii + 439.

'Republican Rome bequeathed to the world two hitherto-unknown formulae: Italian Unity; a Mediterranean Empire'. M. Home's book is devoted to the explanation of how and why these came to be. It does not deal largely with the narration of events or with the critical examination of sources on points of detail. It is rather a summing up of the chief lines of development conceived in political and geographical terms.

Beginning with a brief and not over definitive survey of the sources of information, the author takes up the prehistoric period of Italian history. He accounts in a clear and consistent manner for the successive ages of culture found in early Italy and for the migrations of the Italic and other peoples whom we find occupying the peninsula when we first obtain written records. The most significant of these movements, he thinks, is the Etruscan migration and conquest of Northern and Central Italy, not only because it aided the material prosperity of Rome and stimulated the Romans to aspire to the hegemony of Latium, but also because the Etruscan Empire itself formed a precedent for the unification of Italy. The discussions of such mooted subjects as the Septimontium are based frankly on topographical considerations. The reader cannot help feeling a little doubtful of that method of determining historical developments.

The theme of the second "Book" is the unification of Italy by Rome. Here the author makes free use of the Roman traditions extant in the works of Livy and of Dionysius of Halicarnassus without giving the impression of having thoroughly mastered their criticism. He sums up the policy of Rome as a nice balance between the principles of annexation and alliance. This part of the work follows rather closely the account in Livy, and shares in the vividness of that prince of narrators. The maps illustrating the battle of Sentinum are particularly helpful. The neglect of the economic, social, and cultural influence and of the internal politics of the city make the account seem rather one-sided.

The last third of the volume deals with the conquest of the Mediterranean World by Rome. The superiority of his sources, especially Polybius, frees M. Home from the necessity of offering so much pure hypothesis and permits him to give more by way of interpretation. His analysis of Roman character, although not obtrusive, shows much psychological insight. Of considerable moment are his conclusions: Roman imperialism was not a conscious plan deliberately conceived and executed, but the result of the attempts of Roman statesmen to solve successively the political problems posed by the geographical position of Italy. These had reference chiefly to the control of the Tyrrhenian and Adriatic Seas, and to the 'rounding out' of the Italian dominion by the conquest of the Po valley. The wars that ensued were in the main defensive. In 264 and 200, however, Rome could have shunned the conflict, but did not do so, from a conviction that war was inevitable and that the opportunity to wage a 'defensive' war ought not be neglected. She made a grave error in turning to the East before conquering and assimilating Spain and Gaul. Had she waited, she might have had the effective masses of virile Westerners as reserves in the impending conflict of cultures and not have been so completely demoralized by the Orient or conquered by the Teutonic invaders. She feared, however, the rise of a Balkan State under the leadership of Macedon, and so forced the issue. Her policy in the second century was de-

termined neither by economic aggression nor by sentimental Philhellenism, but by the chain of circumstances that involved her in events in which she had no desire to participate but which she did not dare to ignore.

DICKINSON COLLEGE

HERBERT WING, JR.

## THE 'PIETY' OF THE GODS

In connection with Professor Joseph William Hewitt's valuable article on The Gratitude of the Gods (THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY 18.148-151), it may be of interest to note that the gods may owe or show to man not only gratitude, but also another quality that ordinarily we should expect to find exhibited rather by man toward the gods or toward his fellow-men—namely, *pietas*.

Thus in the Aeneid *pietas* is attributed to the gods in their relation to men, in 2.536 *si qua est caelo pietas*, 4.382 *si quid pia numina possunt*, 5.688-689 *si quid pietas antiqua labores respicit humanos*, and, possibly, 5.783 *Iunonem pietas nec mitigat ulla*. In 12.839 *supra homines, supra ire deos pietate videbis*, it is said that the Romans will surpass not only men but even the gods in 'piety'—which is surely out-Heroding Herod with a vengeance!

Similarly, though the verb *sacrare* regularly denotes an action of man in honor of the gods, it is twice used of an action of a divine agent in favor of man: 10.419-420 *<ei=Halaeso> iniicere manum Parcae telisque <eum> sacraverunt Euandri*, and 12.140-141 *hunc illi . . honorem Iuppiter . . sacravit*.

HUNTER COLLEGE

E. ADELAIDE HAHN

## CICERO AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCE

Sentences like those quoted below from an editorial in The New York Times (October 4, 1925) bear a striking resemblance to Cicero's pointed remarks on the "financial nervous system" of his day, De Imperio Cn. Pompei 15-19, especially these sentences in 19: *Non enim possunt una in civitate multi rem ac fortunas amittere ut non pluris secum in eandem trahant calamitatem, a quo periculo prohibere rem publicam. Etenim—mihi credite id quod ipsi videtis—haec fides atque haec ratio pecuniarum quae Romae, quae in foro versatur, implicata est cum illis pecuniis Asiaticis et cohaeret; ruere illa non possunt ut haec non eodem labefacta motu concidant:*

### "The World A Financial Unit

The French debt negotiation at Washington was like the shot of the embattled farmers at Concord Bridge. It was heard round the world. Echoes and reactions were not confined to the two countries most directly concerned. British financial opinion was stirred. The repercussions in Italy, whence a mission to adjust the Italian debt is soon to arrive in the United States, were naturally widespread. *It might seem as if all nations were now connected up by what might be called a single financial nervous system. A shock at one point makes itself felt everywhere else. And a centre of well-being distributes its impetus to all other places*".

BROWN UNIVERSITY

J. W. SPAETH, JR.

<sup>1</sup>Henry is inclined to interpret *pietas* as pity on Juno's part. However, it seems to me to mean rather piety on Aeneas's part, as Conington takes it (note that the other elements—*longa dies*, *Iovis imperium*, and *fata*—which are said also to fail in effect on Juno, are all purely external and objective).

<sup>2</sup>The italics are mine.